2.3 Explain hardware assurance best practices
Hardware root of trust:
TPM: generates/stores cryptographic keys; full disk encryption; keeps hardware locked until authentication is complete; motherboard-embedded chip
HSM: manage/generate/store cryptographic keys; removeable/external device
eFuse: manufacturer can change circuits on a chip while it is in operation
UEFI: secure boot (only signed apps used at boot; OS needs recognised key to boot)
Trusted foundry: DoD program to secure supply chain of hardware for military
Secure processing:
Trusted execution: assures OS trust using TPM; prevents system/BIOS code corruption or platform configuration modification from stealing sensitive data (Intel)
Secure enclave: separately booted microkernel to store private decryption keys; apps never have direct access to the keys (Apple)
Processor security extensions: core can switch to secure state (only trusted code can run; can access secure memory; strict security state entry control) (ARM)
Atomic execution: cannot be interrupted by other threads; thread locking; shared data is always valid => thread safety
Anti-tamper: unusual screws/bolts; secure cryptoprocessors; zeroise when tampered; chips can't be accessed externally; fracture when interfered
Self-encrypting drive: user password to decrypt media; encrypt as data is written and decrypt as data is retrieved; encryption is invisible to user (can't be turned off)
Trusted firmware updates: copy images from non-secure to secure memory; image identification/authentication (Intel)
Measured boot and attestation: object signature hashes are recorded in TPM (measured boot); host reliably authenticates hardware/software config to remote server to determine level of trust in platform (remote attestation)
Bus encryption: encrypted instructions in data bus; executed by cryptoprocessor
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